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KOHL V. UNION INSURANCE COMPANY. INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF THE "ARISING OUT OF THE USE"
CLAUSE IN AN AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY
INSURANCE POLICY
INTRODUCTION
Few activities in modern society are carried out without the use of
an automobile. Although an automobile liability policy is not intended
to cover all accidents, auto insurance is frequently the only means of
recovery for the plaintiff or the only source of financial insulation for the
negligent defendant.' As a result, there has been an increase in the vol-
ume of litigation regarding the scope of coverage extended by automo-
bile insurance policies.
2
Among other things, this litigation has focused upon the meaning
of the policy terms "arising out of the use" and "using" the insured
vehicle.3 In particular, this language has plagued numerous cases in-
volving the accidental discharge of weapons in or about motor vehicles.
4
The purpose of this article is to discuss the application of the particular
facts of Kohl v. Union Insurance Co., 5 to the term "arising out of the use"
of a vehicle as contained in the context of the basic automobile insur-
ance agreement, and to explore the logic inherent in the Colorado
Supreme Court's decision.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History and Interpretation of the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act
In 1973, the Colorado State General Assembly passed the "Colo-
rado Auto Accident Reparations Act.''6 The General Assembly declared
that the purpose of this Act was to "avoid inadequate compensation to
victims of automobile accidents; to require registrants of motor vehicles
... to procure insurance covering legal liability arising out of ownership
or use of such vehicles and also providing benefits to persons occupying
such vehicles and to persons injured in accidents involving such vehi-
cles." 7 Accordingly, this Act defines the minimal coverage required of
1. Sayre, Coverage Problems Relating to the Polic' Terms "Arising Out Of The Use Of" and
"Using" A Vehicle, 36 INS. COUNS. J. 253 (1969).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Cameron Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ward, 599 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); see
generally Annotation, Automobile Liability Insurance-Risks, 89 A.L.R.2d 150 (1963) (analyzing
cases in which courts have attempted to construe the "arising out of the ownership, main-
tenance or use" clause to determine whether an accident was within the coverage provi-
sion of an automobile liability policy).
5. 731 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1986).
6. Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 10-4-701 to -720.
(1973 & Supp. 1985).
7. Id. at § 10-4-702.
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all automobile liability policies. The Act demands that insurers provide
coverage for damages "arising out of the use of the motor vehicle."
Many automobile insurance policies contain language similar to the
"arising out of the use" clause. Consequently, this terminology has be-
come standardized in the automobile insurance industry9 and insurance
contracts should be construed in accordance with this custom or trade
usage. 10 Furthermore, when confronted with statutory authority that
automobile insurance coverage is extended to accidents "arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle," a complying
policy must provide for legal liability coverage in light of these statutory
requirements." Thus, by operation of law, the minimal statutory re-
quirements must be read into all automobile insurance contracts.'
2
B. Standard Interpretations Given to the "Arising Out of the Use" Clause
When the language of an insurance contract is susceptible to differ-
ent interpretations, a liberal interpretation that favors the insured will
be preferred. 13 Consequently, the inherent ambiguity in the phrase
"arising out of the use," has been construed to be a broad, comprehen-
sive term meaning "originating from," "growing out of," or "flowing
from,' 1 4 the use of the automobile. This is a more expansive interpre-
tation than the words "caused by."' 15 The "arising out of the use"
clause, therefore, is intended to afford broad coverage to protect the
8. Id. at § 10-4-706(l)(a); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-7-413(l)(c) (1973 & Supp.
1985). This statutory provision similarly states: "The policy of liability insurance shall
insure every such person on account of the maintenance, use, or operation of the motor
vehicle . . . against lois from the liability imposed by law; for damages, ... arising from
such maintenance, use, or operation .... "
9. National Merchandise Co. v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 400 So. 2d 526, 531 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981). In National, an automobile insurance policy explicitly provided cov-
erage for "[Blodily injury or property damage for which any covered person becomes le-
gally responsible because of an automobile accident." Id. at 529. Acknowledging that the
Florida statute dealing with insurance extended automobile liability coverage to accidents
"arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle," the court stated
"[t]he law in existence at the time of the making of a contract forms a part of that contract,
as if it were expressly referred to in its terms." Id. at 531. Therefore, the court concluded
that the term "auto accident" must be construed to provide coverage for accidents "aris-
ing out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle." Id. at 533.
10. Id. at 531; see also 13 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7388 at 189
(1976) which states: "[Ulsage of trade which is so well settled and generally known that all
persons engaged in such trade may be considered as contracting with reference to it, has
been regarded as forming a part of a contract of insurance entered into to protect risks in
such trade."
I. National, 400 So. 2d at 531; see Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 690 P.2d 227,
229 (Colo. 1984).
12. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
13. E.g., American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Soules, 288 Ala. 163, 169, 258 So. 2d 872, 878
(1972). See generally 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance §§ 1-4 (1980). A basic rule of con-
tracts is that when there is doubt as the meaning of a written agreement, it should be
interpreted against the party who has drafted it. Id. § 3, at 447.
14. E.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Bruecks, 179 Neb. 642,649, 139 N.W.2d 821,
826 (1966); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Walker, 33 N.C. App. 15, 19, 234 S.E.2d 206, 210 (1977).
15. E.g., Reliance, 33 N.C. App. at 19, 234 S.E.2d at 210; Note, Construction of the Clause
"Arising Out of the Use of" in an Automobile Liability Insurance Policy, 45 NEB. L. REV. 811
(1966) [hereinafter Note, Construction].
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insured against liability for damages resulting from acts done "in con-
nection with," or "incident to" the use of a vehicle.16 There must, how-
ever, be some degree of causal relation or connection between the
injury and the use of the vehicle because the parties to an automobile
liability policy do not contemplate a general liability contract.17
Generally, "but for" causation is enough to establish the required
degree of causal relation or connection.' 8 Because coverage is ex-
tended if an accident would not have occurred but for the use of the
vehicle, 19 the "arising out of the use" clause does not require the vehi-
cle to be, in the strict legal sense, a proximate cause of the injury.
20
Rather, the events giving rise to the claim must merely "arise out of,"
and be "related to," the vehicle's use. 2 1 Such "use" of the automobile
must arise out of the inherent nature of the vehicle, 22 and the "use" may
not be one which is foreign to the vehicle's inherent purpose. 23 An in-
jury arises out of the use of the automobile if it flows from a natural and
reasonable consequence of the use of the vehicle, even if the use is not
foreseen or expected.2 4 The injury does not arise out of the use of an
automobile if it was directly caused by some independent act totally re-
mote from the use of the vehicle.
2 5
Unlike the "arising out of the use" clause, the specific term "use"
has defied precise construction and definition. 26 Due to its inherent am-
biguity, it has been described as a general catch-all term. 2 7 Use has
16. Note, Construction, supra note 15, at 811.
17. Sayre, supra note 1, at 253. See generally 12 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE
LAw § 45:56 (1981) (describing the necessity of a causal relationship).
18. E.g., Norgaard v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 201 N.W.2d 871, 875 (N.D. 1972) (quoting
1 R. LONG, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 1.22, at 1-57 (1987)).
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., Titan Constr. Co. v. Nolf, 183 Colo. 188, 194, 515 P.2d 1123, 1126
(1973). The court explained:
The question is not one in the field of torts of proximate cause of the accident,
but one in the field of contracts of coverage under the wording of an insurance
contract. While there must be a causal relationship between the insured use ....
and the accident, the question is not whether the insured [vehicle] was the cause
of the accident.
Id. (quoting from St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Huitt, 336 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1964)). See
generally 1 R. LONG, supra note 18, at § 1.24 (denoting the effect of the "arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use" phrase).
21. E.g., Sayre, supra note 1, at 254. See generally 7 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 13, § 194, at
700-04 (illustrating what are accidents or injuries "arising out of" ownership, mainte-
nance, or use of the insured automobile).
22. E.g., Azar v. Employers Casualty Co., 178 Colo. 58, 61, 495 P.2d 554, 555 (1972).
23. Id. at 61, 495 P.2d at 555. See generally 6BJ. APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 4316, at
341 (describing the general construction of the specific term "use").
24. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Walker, 33 N.C. App. 15, 19, 234 S.E.2d 206, 210-11 (1977).
25. For example, in Raines v. Insurance Co., 9 N.C. App. 27, 175 S.E.2d 299 (1970),
an occupant, while sitting inside the parked vehicle, was playing with a firearm which acci-
dentally discharged, killing the victim who was also sitting within the vehicle. The issue
was whether the victims' death was covered by an accident arising out of the use of the
parked vehicle. The court held that there was no causal connection between the discharge
of the firearm and the "use" of the vehicle. Thus, the shooting was the result of a "cause
wholly disassociated" from the use of the vehicle. For further examples of similar hold-
ings, see infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
26. Annotation, supra note 4, § 3, at 153.
27. E.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 491 S.W.2d 363, 365
1988]
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been construed to extend to any utilization of the insured vehicle in a
manner intended or contemplated by the insured. 28
A question frequently arising is whether the "use" of a vehicle in-
cludes the physical process of loading and unloading property from the
automobile absent any provision or exclusion in the automobile insur-
ance policy. When the insurance contract specifically defines "use" as
including loading and unloading, the policy is understood to provide
indemnification for accidents or injuries that occur during loading and
unloading. 29 Furthermore, when a policy specifically fails to mention
loading and unloading, "use" has been given a broad interpretation that
includes these terms.
3 0
When interpreting the "loading and unloading" clause, courts have
developed doctrines which define the scope of coverage. 3 1 The majority
ofjurisdictions, including Colorado,3 2 have adopted the "completed op-
eration" doctrine.3 3 This test contemplates that "loading commences
when the items to be transported leave their original location, and, con-
versely, that unloading does not cease until they have actually reached
their final destination."'3 4 Consequently, this doctrine embraces all ac-
tivities necessary to effect a completed delivery.3 5 Thus, an accident may
"arise out of the use" of a vehicle when the accident occurred as a result
of activities related to the loading or unloading of the vehicle.
36
Although there has been general agreement regarding the interpre-
tation given to the "arising out of the use" clause, a problem arises in its
(Tenn. 1973). See generally Annotation, supra note 4, § 9(h), at 171 (citing cases holding
that the term "use" in the "ownership, maintenance or use" clause included the activity of
unloading the vehicle).
28. Travelers, 491 S.W.2d at 365. See generally Annotation, supra note 4, § 9(h), at 171.
29. E.g., Morari v. Atlantic Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Ariz. 537, 538, 468 P.2d 564, 565
(1970); Sayre, supra note 1, at 256.
30. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Truck Exch., 63 Wis. 2d 148, 153, 216 N.W.2d 205, 210
(1974). See generally 7 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 13, § 130, at 606-07 (the absence of specific
modifiers such as "loading and unloading" does not restrict what constitutes "use" of a
vehicle, rather, this absence demonstrates the broad interpretation given to the term
"use"). But see Kurdziel v. Pittsburgh Tube Co., 416 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1969) (the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Ohio Supreme Court had adopted an
opposing position by not recognizing the act of loading and unloading as part of "using").
31. E.g., Recent Decisions, Insurance - "Loading" Clause Of Auto Liability Policy Covers
Death By Accidental Discharge Of Shotgun, 21 MD. L. REv. 270, 271 (1961).
32. Titan Constr. Co. v. Nolf, 183 Colo. 188, 515 P.2d 1123 (1973); Colorado Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. West Am. Ins. Co., 35 Colo. App. 380, 540 P.2d 1112 (1975).
33. E.g., Recent Decisions, supra note 31, at 271.
34. Id. The "completed operation" view therefore omits any distinction between
"loading" and preparatory activities or "unloading" and "delivery."
35. See, e.g., Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 F.2d 865,
867 (10th Cir. 1972) (where the temporary placing of a rifle on the tailgate of a camper did
not serve to terminate the unloading procedure and did not provide a basis for holding
that the policy did not provide coverage for an injury which occurred as a result of the
accidental discharge of the rifle).
36. Id. at 867. A second and more restrictive view is represented by the "coming to
rest" doctrine. This suggests that "loading" commences when the article has left its rest-
ing place and is in the process of being carried to or placed in the vehicle. Conversely,
"unloading" terminates after the item is physically lifted from the vehicle and has actually
reached its first resting place. See Recent Decisions, supra note 31, at 271.
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application 37 in situations involving the accidental discharge of firearms.
The difficulty centers around the determination of whether the facts of
the particular case are sufficient to support the required degree of causal
connection between the accident or injury and the "use" of the vehicle
as contemplated by the parties to the insurance contract.
38
C. Colorado Cases: The Application of the "Arising Out of the Use" Clause
The earliest Colorado case dealing with the accidental discharge of
a firearm inside the insured motor vehicle is Mason v. Celina Mutual Insur-
ance Co.3 9 In Mason, teenagers were sitting in a car waiting for the in-
sured driver to return from a class. While "toying with a pistol," it
accidentally discharged, killing one of the teenagers. The court held
that the accident did not arise out of a covered use of the automobile
and that there was not a causal connection between the discharge of the
pistol and the parked vehicle.
40
. The next case dealing with the discharge of a firearm within an in-
sured automobile is Azar v. Employers Casualty Co.4 1 In this case, the par-
ties were hunting rabbits along a public highway. The driver prepared
to fire a shotgun through the car window, but when another car ap-
proached, he brought the shotgun back into the vehicle where it acci-
dentally discharged, injuring the passenger. The supreme court held
that the automobile liability policy provided no coverage because the
injury did not "originate from," "grow out of," or "flow from" the use
of the vehicle. 4 2 The court concluded that the act of hunting from in-
side a moving vehicle was not an inherent use of an automobile and
therefore that the injury "originated from," "grew out of," or "flowed
from" the independent use of the firearm.
43
In the following year, the supreme court had another opportunity
to interpret the "arising out of the use" clause in the landmark case of
Titan Construction Co. v. Nolf.4 4 Although this case did not involve the
accidental discharge of a firearm, it does provide guidance concerning
what constitutes "use" of a motor vehicle for insurance purposes. In
Titan, the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the "but for" test of causa-
tion with regard to interpreting the coverage clauses of Colorado motor
vehicle liability policies. 4 5 The court held that an insurer was liable to a
37. See generally Annotation, supra note 4, at 150-73 (citing cases illustrating the diffi-
culty of applying the "arising out of the use" clause to varying fact patterns).
38. Id. § 2, at 153.
39. 161 Colo. 442, 423 P.2d 24 (1967).
40. Id. at 444, 423 P.2d at 25 (although the victim was sitting in the car at the time of
the accidental discharge, this was not a "use" of the vehicle as contemplated by the parties
to the insurance agreement).
41. 178 Colo. 58, 495 P.2d 554 (1972).
42. Id. at 61, 495 P.2d.at 555.
43. Id. The court determined that even though the vehicle was being "used" while
hunting, the primary item being "used" at the time of the discharge was the firearm itself.
The firearm was being handled for the primary purpose of hunting. Therefore, the "use"
of the vehicle was merely incidental to the use of the firearm.
44. 183 Colo. 188, 515 P.2d 1123 (1973).
45. Id. at 194, 515 P.2d at 1126. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
1988]
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worker injured by a falling brick. The brick was dislodged from the roof
of a building under construction by a pipe connected to a cement
truck. 46 The conclusion in Titan illustrates the broad coverage provided
by applying the "but for" test of causation. Although the truck ap-
peared to only have a small degree of causal connection with the result-
ing injury, coverage was afforded because the accident would not have
occurred but for the unloading of the truck.
4 7
The most recent Colorado case, prior to Kohl, which involved the
accidental discharge of a firearm in an automobile, was Colorado Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. West American Insurance Co.4 8 In this case,
the driver had placed his rifle on the front seat of the vehicle in prepara-
tion for travel from one hunting location to another. While reaching
either into the back seat for a pair of binoculars or reaching across the
front seat to unlock the passenger door, he lifted the rifle and it dis-
charged, injuring another passenger. Acknowledging that "[t]he rifle
and the binoculars had been . . . [placed in the vehicle] and the victim
was waiting to load' or enter it," the court reasoned that "the accident
occurred between the time of commencement and conclusion of the
loading and unloading of the insured vehicle, and the accident would
not have occurred but for' that operation."'4 9 The court concluded that
the driver's continued involvement in the "loading" process constituted
a "use" of the automobile and thus coverage was afforded under the
insured's automobile liability policy. 50
In 1977, the Colorado Supreme Court considered the concept of
"use" of a motor vehicle in the case of Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Drum.5 1
Although not a gun discharge case, Dairyland sets forth general guide-
lines to be followed in coverage cases. 52 The supreme court extended
the coverage of matters "arising out of the use" of a vehicle beyond the
court of appeals' restrictive interpretation of the term "use", by holding
that the driver of a vehicle towing another vehicle is "using" the towed
vehicle for purposes of insurance coverage. 53 The supreme court based
their decision on the principle that a "use" of the insured vehicle is
found where "the vehicle was dealt with in a manner that created or had
46. Titan, 183 Colo. at 194, 515 P.2d at 1126.
47. Titan also established that Colorado adopted the "completed operation" doctrine
with respect to interpreting "loading and unloading" provisions contained in an automo-
bile liability policy.
48. 35 Colo. App. 380, 540 P.2d 1112 (1975).
49. Id. at 384, 540 P.2d at 1114.
50. Id. The court followed precedent adopted in Titan which firmly established that
Colorado adopted both the "but for" test of causation and the "completed operation"
doctrine with respect to determining coverage in automobile liability policies.
51. 193 Colo. 519, 568 P.2d 459 (1977).
52. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
53. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Drum, 37 Colo. App. 222, 546 P.2d 1283 (1975), rev'd, 193
Colo. 519, 568 P.2d 459 (1977). In Dairyland, a vehicle being towed was temporarily posi-
tioned in the center of a highway as a result of the towing vehicle's attempt to make a U-
turn. Consequently, a third automobile collided with the towed vehicle injuring the driver
and two other passengers of the third automobile. The supreme court reversed the court
of appeals' decision which held that the driver of the towing vehicle was solely "using" his
own vehicle for purposes of determining liability.
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the potential of creating an unreasonably dangerous situation." '54 The
Dairyland opinion adopted the reasoning of Baudin v. Traders General In-
surance Co. 55 by applying the same set of tests to determine whether a
motor vehicle was "used" for purposes of liability coverage. 56 The tests
set forth in Dairyland further exemplify Colorado's adoption of the "but
for" test when determining the extent of coverage under automobile in-
surance policies.
5 7
A final Colorado case which illustrates the broad coverage provided
by applying the "but for" test is the case of Trinity Universal Insurance Co.
v. Hall.58 In Trinity, a woman was injured when a side awning attached
to a truck, being used as a refreshment stand, collapsed. The court held
that the injury "arose out of the use" of the vehicle reasoning that the
injury would not have occurred but for the use of the truck for the sale
of refreshments. 59 In discussing the "use" being made of the truck, the
court stated the "use" of a motor vehicle as contemplated in an insur-
ance policy depends upon the factual context of each case. 60
D. Decisions From Other Jurisdictions Applying the "Arising Out of the Use"
Clause to Cases Involving the Discharge of a Firearm
The judicial application of the "arising out of the use" clause has
not produced a clear cut pattern of interpretation. However, a close
examination of the factual distinctions that exist between cases involving
the discharge of a firearm will reveal that some degree of uniformity has
evolved. 6 1 The cases are categorized according to their underlying
facts.
The first category of cases illustrates fact patterns in which the acci-
54. Dairyland, 193 Colo. at 522, 568 P.2d at 462.
55. 201 So. 2d 379 (La. Ct. App. 1967), rev'd, 423 So. 2d 1080 (La. 1982).
56. The court adopted the following tests to determine "use" for purposes of liability
coverage:
(1) The dangerous situation causing injury must have its source in the use of the
automobile; (2) The chain of events resulting in the accident must originate in the
use of the automobile and be unbroken by the intervention of any event which
has no direct or substantial relation to the use of the vehicle; (3) The accident
must be a natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the vehi-
cle for the purposes contemplated by the policy, although not necessarily fore-
seen or expected; (4) The accident must be one which can be "immediately"
identified with the use of the automobile as contemplated by the parties to the
policy; (5) The accident must be of a type reasonably associated with the use of
the automobile as contemplated by the contracting parties; (6) The accident must
be one which would not have happened "but for" the use of the automobile.
Dairyland, 193 Colo. at 522, 568 P.2d at 462.
57. The Colorado Supreme Court stated its agreement with the reasoning employed
by the Baudin court which included the application of the "but for" test. Thus, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court essentially reinforced the application of the "but for" test adopted in
Titan. Id.
58. 690 P.2d 227 (Colo. 1984).
59. Id. at 231.
60. Id. at 228.
61. See Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 599 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (creating
five principal categories for purposes of illustrating the factual distinctions between vehi-
cle-gun discharge cases which determine the existence or nonexistence of coverage under
automobile insurance policies).
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dental discharge of the firearm occurred while an occupant of the vehi-
cle was either "toying" with the weapon or was "handling" the weapon
while in the act of hunting. The previously discussed Colorado cases of
Mason6 2 and Azar 63 typify this fact pattern. These cases 64 uniformly
hold that no coverage exists under the "arising out of the use" clause
because no causal connection exists between the accidental discharge, of
the firearms and the inherent use of the vehicles.
6 5
The second category encompasses situations where the discharge
occurred during the process of placing or removing the firearm into or
from the vehicle. For example, in Viani v. Aetna Insurance Co., 6 6 the
owner of an insured pickup truck was injured by the discharge of a con-
cealed loaded pistol while unloading camping gear from his vehicle.
The Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that the "loading and unloading"
provision in the insured's automobile liability policy was an extension of
the term "use," and that the policy provided coverage for the injury
which occurred during the process of unloading the truck. 6 7 Cases in-
volving similar fact patterns consistently hold that coverage exists be-
cause the term "use" includes the process of "loading" and
"unloading" the vehicles. 68
The third category involves fact patterns in which a physical portion
of the vehicle is used as a "gun rest." These cases do not reveal uniform
results. For example, in Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Lott,6 9 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found a causal connection between the use of the vehi-
cle as a gun rest and the resulting injury to a passenger after the gun was
fired. 70 In the factually similar case of Norgaard v. Nodak Mutual Insurance
Co.,7 ' the North Dakota Supreme Court reached a contrary result on the
theory that the use of the rifle constituted an independent and interven-
ing cause of the injury.
72
The fourth category consists of fact patterns in which the firearm
discharged as it was being positioned in or removed from a gun rack
attached to the vehicle. In Reliance Insurance Co. v. Walker,73 the North
62. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Brenner v. Aetna Ins. Co., 8 Ariz. App. 272, 445 P.2d 474 (1968); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 14 Wash. App. 541, 543 P.2d 645 (1975).
65. Cameron, 559 S.W.2d at 15. Courts have reasoned that the automobiles are simply
the "locus" of the resulting injuries.
66. 95 Idaho 22, 501 P.2d 706 (1972).
67. Id. at 32, 501 P.2d at 716.
68. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 190 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Mich. 1961) (insured's
shotgun accidentally discharged while he was ejecting shells from it in preparation for its
entry into the trunk of his vehicle); Morari v. Atlantic Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Ariz. 537, 468
P.2d 564 (1970) (owner of the insured vehicle reached into his car for his loaded gun
which accidentally discharged causing injury to another passenger).
69. 273 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1960).
70. Id. (the roof of the vehicle was used as a gun rest).
71. 201 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 1972).
72. Norgaard, 201 N.W.2d at 876; see also National Farmers Union & Casualty Co. v.
Gibbons, 338 F. Supp. 430 (D. N.D. 1972) (use of the vehicle as a gun rest was foreign to
the vehicle's inherent purpose and therefore, coverage was denied).
73. 33 N.C. App. 15, 234 S.E.2d 206 (1977).
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Carolina Court of Appeals noted that the presence of the gun rack es-
tablished that the truck may be used for the transportation of guns.
Thus, the court concluded that "the shooting was a 'natural and reason-
able incident or consequence of the use' of the truck and was not the
result of something 'wholly disassociated from, independent of, and re-
mote from' the truck's normal use."' 74 Cases involving these fact pat-
terns "appear to pivot on the rationale that the presence of permanently
attached gun racks in vehicles establishes a significant causal connection
between the use of such vehicles and the accidental discharge of weap-
ons carried therein, hence affording coverage ... for any resultant inju-
"75nes ....
The final category highlights fact patterns where the discharge of
the firearm occurred inside the vehicle as a result of the movement or
operation of the vehicle. In Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Co. v. Stevens,
76
a pistol accidentally discharged and killed a passenger when the vehicle
turned onto a bumpy, unpaved road. In accordance with decisions of
other jurisdictions, 77 the Georgia court found a causal connection be-
tween the accidental discharge of the firearm and the movement, i.e.
use, of the vehicle.
78
These factual distinctions display the importance of examining the
totality of circumstances surrounding an accident in order to determine
if the accident "arose out of the use" of a vehicle. By analyzing the
specific role of the automobile in the entire episode, courts are able to
establish whether coverage is afforded under the respective automobile
liability policy. 79 Each case must be determined upon its own facts ac-
cording to the part the vehicle played in the entire occurrence.80
II. KOHL V. UNION INSURANCE COMPANY
A. Facts
On October 12, 1980, Carol Ray Weaver, Phyllip Connelly, Terry
Clear, Rex Kohl, and Tony Martino, residents of Canon City, were re-
turning from a hunting trip in the mountains of Colorado. At this point
in time, the parties did not intend to engage in any further hunting.8 1
74. Id. at 20, 234 S.E.2d at 211; see also Transamerica Ins. Group v. United Pac. Ins.
Co., 92 Wash. 2d 21, 593 P.2d 156 (1979) (the court stated that in similar fact patterns the
vehicle has been considered more than the mere "situs" of the injury and thus the "arising
out of the use" clause should afford coverage).
75. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 599 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
76. 142 Ga. App. 562, 236 S.E.2d 550 (1977).
77. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 109 Cal. Rptr.
811, 514 P.2d 123 (1973) (a pistol with a "hair trigger" accidentally discharged and in-
jured a passenger when the vehicle hit a bump).
78. Stevens, 142 Ga. App. at 564, 236 S.E.2d at 551.
79. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Burris, 240 So. 2d 408, 409-10 (La. Ct. App.
1970).
80. Id.
81. Brief for Appellants Kohl and Martino at 2, Union Ins. Co. v. Connelly, 694 P.2d
354 (Colo. App. 1984) (No. 82-0683), rev'd sub nom. Kohl v. Union Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 134
(Colo. 1986) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants].
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On the trip home, Weaver was riding alone in his jeep while the other
four were divided between two other cars. Weaver's hunting rifle was
positioned in a gun rack mounted above the dashboard of his jeep.
Weaver had installed the gun rack for the purpose of transporting his
rifle.82
Two hours into the trip, they stopped for refreshments at a store in
Cotopaxi, Colorado. When Weaver arrived at the store, his companions
were conversing in the parking lot. Weaver parked his jeep and then
joined the group in the parking lot. After a short conversation, Weaver
returned to his jeep intending to remove the keys from the ignition in
order to open a spare gas can. While reaching inside the jeep, Weaver
noticed his rifle and decided that he would "put it away." 8 3 Weaver
intended to remove his gun from the gun rack, unload it and place it in
its scabbard for the remainder of the trip home.84 While positioned in
the gun rack, the loaded rifle was pointed toward the passenger side of
the jeep. As Weaver was removing the weapon from the gun rack, the
rifle discharged. Kohl and Martino were seriously injured and Connelly
was killed. Although Weaver states that it was possible for the rifle to
have bumped or touched something besides his hand, he cannot recall
whether that actually happened.
8 5
B. Initiation of the Action
Kohl, Martino, and the estate of Connelly filed claims with Weaver's
automobile insurance carrier, Union Insurance Company (Union). In
response, Union filed an action for declaratory judgment to determine
whether the accident was covered by Weaver's automobile insurance.
Weaver's insurance policy provided that Union "will pay damages for
bodily injury or property damage for which any covered person becomes
legally responsible because of an auto accident. '"86 All parties filed mo-
tions for summary judgment in the Jefferson County District Court. On
April 26, 1982, the district court granted Union's motion for summary
judgment, concluding that there was no causal connection between the
"use" of the automobile and the injuries, and therefore, no insurance
coverage under the policy. 8 7 From that ruling, Kohl, Martino, and the
estate of Connelly, appealed.
C. Decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals
Affirming the trial court, the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded
that Weaver's automobile insurance policy did not provide coverage for
82. Id. at 1.
83. Id. at 3.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 5. By operation of law, the term "auto accident" must be interpreted to
mean and given the same effect as the required statutory language "arising out of the use"
of the motor vehicle. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
87. Union Ins. Co. v. Connelly, 694 P.2d 354, 356 (Colo. App. 1984), rev'd sub non.
Kohl v. Union Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1986).
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the injuries sustained by the victims resulting from the accidental dis-
charge of Weaver's rifle. The court reasoned that the unloading of a
rifle inside a jeep is not within the inherent purpose for which a jeep is
used. Furthermore, the court agreed with the trial court that the de-
fendants failed to establish the requisite causal connection between the
discharge of the weapon and the parked automobile. Considering
Weaver's statement that to his knowledge nothing other than his hand
was touching the rifle at the time it discharged, the court of appeals con-
cluded that the vehicle did not contribute in any way to the discharge of
the rifle. Based upon this finding, the court determined that the injuries
arose out of the use of the rifle, rather than out of the use of the
automobile.
88
D. Decision of the Colorado Supreme Court
Not persuaded by the court of appeals' reasoning, the Colorado
Supreme Court concluded that the accidental discharge of the rifle
"grew out of" the use of Weaver's vehicle for purposes of coverage
under his automobile insurance policy.8 9 The court held that Weaver's
use of his jeep to transport his rifle for the purpose of hunting was a
conceivable use of his vehicle which was not foreign to its inherent pur-
pose. The court reasoned that the transportation of hunters and their
weapons is a conceivable use of a four-wheel drive vehicle. Weaver had
installed a gun rack in his vehicle to facilitate that use.90 The supreme
court felt that Weaver's action in lifting the rifle out of the gun rack was
intimately related to his use of the vehicle as transportation for himself
and his rifle. Therefore, the court determined that the victims' injuries
were causally related to Weaver's use of his vehicle.9 1
E. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Rovira, in a lengthy dissenting opinion,9 2 asserted that the
majority reached its decision by applying an incorrect analysis and con-
sequently rendered a decision contrary to prior case law. Although the
dissent maintained that there must be a causal relation or connection
between the vehicle and the accident, the minority asserted that merely
satisfying the "but for" test of causation was not sufficient to establish
that the injuries sustained "arose out of the use" of the vehicle. The
dissent firmly contended that there must be a stronger causal relation or
connection between the vehicle and the accident.9 3 The dissent stated
that the "use" of the jeep did not contribute in any way to the acci-
dent.9 4 The only relationship between the vehicle and the accident was
the presence of the tortfeasor and the victims around the automobile at
88. Connelly, 694 P.2d at 356.
89. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 136.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 137.
92. Id. at 138 (RoviraJ., dissenting).
93. Id. (Rovira, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 139 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
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the time of the accidental discharge. Explicit in the dissent's reasoning
was the notion that unloading a rifle, regardless of where it occurs, is an
inherently dangerous act.9 5 Thus, the dissent concluded that the result-
ing injuries did not arise out of the use of thejeep, but rather, out of the
use of the rifle.
96
III. ANALYSIS
The difficulty in applying the "arising out of the use" clause
presents two issues. First, a court must determine whether the insured
was "using" the automobile within the terms of the insurance policy.
Second, the court must also determine if the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff "arose out of that use." 9 7 The Colorado Supreme Court, in a
well-reasoned analysis, resolved these issues by applying the correct
legal construction of the "arising out of the use" clause to the present
factual situation. In order to fully understand this ruling, it is necessary
to analyze carefully each argument developed by the majority as well as
each counter-argument raised by the dissent.
A. Was the Insured "Using" the Automobile Within the Terms of the Policy?
The supreme court correctly concluded that Weaver's use of his
jeep for the carriage and transportation of his rifle for hunting purposes
was covered under his automobile policy since the use was not foreign
to the vehicle's inherent purpose.9 8 Because of the broad interpretation
which must be given to the term "use," it must be construed to include
the use of a vehicle as a means of transporting not only persons but also
their property. 99 The use of a vehicle to transport a rifle on a hunting
trip is an entirely reasonable and foreseeable use of a vehicle, especially
a four-wheel drive jeep which is designed to perform on rough terrain
frequently associated with hunting areas.i 0 0 Based upon this reasoning,
the majority concluded that the transportation of hunters and their
weapons was a foreseeable use of a vehicle of this kind. Holding that
Weaver's "use" was covered under his respective insurance policy, the
majority had to further establish some causal connection between the
resulting injuries and the "use" of the vehicle.
B. Did a Causal Connection Exist Between the Injuries
and the Use of the Vehicle?
The majority's careful analysis of the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the instant case clearly indicates that they understood how to
apply the legal construction given to the "arising out of the use" clause
95. Id. at 140 (RoviraJ., dissenting).
96. Id. at 141 (RoviraJ., dissenting).
97. See Note, Construction, supra note 15, at 811.
98. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 136.
99. Brief for Appellants, supra note 81, at 19.
100. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 136. The supreme court also noted that Weaver had installed a
gun rack in his vehicle to facilitate that use of his jeep.
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to determine whether an injury was causally related to the use of the
vehicle. Recognizing that the court of appeals failed to apply appropri-
ate contract principles of causation, the supreme court followed the
guidelines announced in Titan 101 for determining whether such "causal
connection" exists. In this process, the majority correctly distinguished
tort rules of proximate cause from insurance contract principles of cau-
sation. 10 2 Consequently, the majority rejected the narrow "actual use"
test in which the "use" of the vehicle must be the efficient, predominat-
ing, or even proximate cause of the accident, 10 3 and applied the "but
for" test announced in Titan which requires a minimal causal connection
between the use of the vehicle and the accident. 10 4 The use of the "but
for" test to establish the existence of a causal relation is consistent with





Applying this test to the instant case, this accident would not have
occurred but for the fact that thejeep was parked immediately adjacent
to the victims so that the loaded rifle resting in the gun rack was point-
ing in their direction. 10 6 Furthermore, but for the fact that Weaver en-
gaged in an unsuccessful attempt to secure the rifle for its continued
transportation, this accident would not have occurred. 10 7 The dissent
suggests that accidental discharge of firearms occurs regularly, and
therefore, this accident could have happened anywhere. 108 This reason-
ing ignores that this particular accident would not have occurred at this
time and place but for the transportation of the loaded rifle in the gun
rack of the jeep. Therefore, the majority appropriately applied the "but
for" test to determine that a causal connection exists.
Justice Rovira's dissent pointed out that, although the Colorado
Supreme Court adopted the "but for" test in Titan, the Titan court also
stated that this test should not apply when there is a lack of relationship
between the vehicle and the accident. 1 09 Rovira then asserted that in
Trinity, the court held that this relationship must be a "causal connec-
tion.,"1 0 Applying Trinity, Justice Rovira argued that "merely satisfying
the extremely broad 'but for' test is not enough; there must be a causal
101. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
102. For a more thorough discussion regarding the application of these principles to
the facts of the instant case, see Petition Brief for Appellants Kohl and Martino, Union Ins.
Co. v. Connelly, 694 P.2d 354 (Colo. App. 1984) (No. 84-381), rev'd sub nom. Kohl v. Union
Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1986) [hereinafter Petition Brief].
103. Titan Construction Co. v. Nolf, 183 Colo. 188, 191, 515 P.2d 1123, 1126 (1973)
(citing Continental Casualty Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 403 F.2d 291 (10th Cir.
1968)).
104. d.
105. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
106. Petition Brief, supra note 102, at 5.
107. Id.
108. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 138 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Rovira, J., dissenting) (citing Titan Construction Co. v. Nolf, 183 Colo. 188,
195, 515 P.2d 1123, 1126 (1973)).
110. Id. (Rovira, J., dissenting) (citing Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 690 P.2d 227
(Colo. 1984)).
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connection between the vehicle and the accident."'"I Based upon this
interpretation, the dissent, like the court of appeals, required a more
rigorous standard of causation than that required by the Titan prece-
dent. Consequently, Justice Rovira asserted that the injuries arose out
of the use of the rifle, rather than the use of the vehicle,' 1 2 erroneously
relying on the previous Colorado cases of Mason and Azar. By failing to
fully acknowledge all the factual distinctions between those cases and
the instant case,1 13 the dissent ignored the obvious causal connection
between Weaver's "use" of his jeep and the resulting injuries.
By analyzing the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the in-
stant case, it is evident that the predominant purpose, at the time of the
discharge, was vehicular transport of the rifle and Weaver himself. It is
important to understand that Weaver was not "using" the rifle at the
time it discharged for any purpose inherent in its being a rifle. In other
words, Weaver was not in the act of "hunting" per se, nor was he in-
tending to "hunt" at the time he lifted the rifle out of the gun rack.
Furthermore, Weaver was not "toying" with the rifle. The sole reason
for removing the rifle was to provide for its safer transportation in his
jeep. Therefore, the discharge of the rifle in this situation, unlike other
firearm cases, related solely to the purpose of the rifle's continued
transportation.114
Clearly, this accident "arose" from the transportation of the rifle,
therefore, the resulting injuries were causally related to the "use" of the
insured vehicle. It may also be contemplated that the "use" of the jeep
may have combined with other causes in contributing to the occurrence
of this accident.' 15 Even this combination of causes clearly satisfies the
Titan test which holds that the alleged cause need not be the predomi-
nant or proximate cause of the injuries.
1 16
The majority could have further supported its conclusion by apply-
ing the set of tests adopted in Dairyland.117 Although the majority stated
that these tests were inconsistent with their opinion, 1 8 applying the cri-
teria of the tests to the facts of the present case results in the conclusion
that this accident was causally related to the use of the vehicle.' 19 This
result is apparent by examining the following factors.
111. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 138 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 141 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
113. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. Unlike Mason and Azar, the Kohl case
was not a "hunting accident," nor was the accident the result of someone "toying" with
the gun. The totality of circumstances surrounding the Kohl case are factually different
and establish that the injuries were not merely coincidental to the use of the automobile.
114. Reply Brief for Appellants Kohl and Martino at 9, Union Ins. Co. v. Connelly, 694
P.2d 354 (Colo. App. 1984) (No. 82-0683), rev'd sub nom. Kohl v. Union Ins. Co., 731 P.2d
134 (Colo. 1986).
115. Petition Brief, supra note 102, at 6.
116. Id. (citing Titan Construction Co. v. Nolf, 183 Colo. 188, 195, 515 P.2d 1123,
1126 (1973)).
117. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Drum, 193 Colo. 519, 568 P.2d 459 (1977).
118. Kohl v. Union Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 134, 135 n.2 (Colo. 1984).
119. Each of the tests adopted in Dairyland for determining "use" is consistent with the
facts of the instant case. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 65:1
KOHL v. UNION INSURANCE COMPANY
First, not only was the jeep used to transport a loaded rifle, but it
was also parked in a position in which the rifle's muzzle was pointed in
the vicinity of the defendants. Therefore, the dangerous situation caus-
ing the injuries has its source in the use of Weaver's vehicle. Second,
the chain of events resulting in this accident originated in the use of the
automobile and were unbroken by the intervention of any event which
had no direct or substantial relation to the use of the jeep. All of the
actions leading up to the time of the rifle's discharge were directly and
substantially related to Weaver's use of his vehicle for the continued
transportation of his rifle.
Third, this accident was a natural and reasonable incident of the use
of the vehicle for the purposes contemplated by the policy although not
necessarily foreseen or expected. It is reasonable to expect that a jeep
may be used for hunting expeditions and that the transportation of
weapons and ammunition is a reasonable consequence of such use.
Therefore, the accidental discharge from Weaver's rifle was a natural
and reasonable incident of the use of his jeep to transport his rifle on a
trip.
Fourth, this accident can be "immediately identified" with the use
of the vehicle because the injuries sustained by the victims were very
closely associated with the use of thejeep as a means of transporting the
rifle. Fifth, this is a type of accident which one could clearly contemplate
when insuring a vehicle which may foreseeably be used for hunting ex-
peditions. Finally, as discussed previously, this accident and the result-
ing injuries would not have occurred "but for" the use of the jeep to
transport the loaded rifle.
1 2 0
The dissent points out that Dairyland also stands for the proposition
that a "use" of a vehicle could be established "where the vehicle was dealt
with in a manner that created or had the potential of creating an unrea-
sonably dangerous situation."'' z Addressing this proposition, the dis-
sent argues that the rifle, not the vehicle, was dealt with in an unsafe
manner. 122 This argument totally ignores the fact that Weaver was "us-
ing" his jeep for the primary and exclusive purpose of transporting him-
self and his loaded rifle which had been placed in a gun rack with its
120. For a detailed discussion concerning the satisfaction of these tests as they apply to
the instant case, see Brief for Appellants, supra note 81, at 8-12.
121. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 140 (Rovira,J., dissenting) (quoting Dairyland, 193 Colo. at 522,
568 P.2d at 462).
122. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 140 (RoviraJ., dissenting). Noting that it is a crime to carry a
loaded rifle in an automobile, the dissent pointed out that if Weaver would have unloaded
his rifle prior to transporting it, this accident would not have occurred inside the vehicle.
Therefore, the dissent concluded that the use of the jeep was by no means causally related
to the resulting injuries. Id. This argument failed to acknowledge that:
[T]he mere fact that a vehicle may have been used unlawfully or an unlawful event
may have occurred during its use, considered alone, does not relieve an insurer
from liability if the accident is otherwise covered under the "ownership, mainte-
nance or use" provision of the automobile insurance contract. If the rule was
otherwise, policy coverage would be invalidated if one ran a stop sign, was guilty
of speeding, or operating with defective equipment.
Transamerica Ins. Group v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 92 Wash. 2d 21, 25, 593 P.2d 156, 160
(1979).
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muzzle pointed toward the passenger door. Consequently, the use of
his jeep in this manner created the unreasonably dangerous situation
which resulted in the injuries.'
23
There are two additional principles of law which support the con-
clusion reached by the supreme court. First, there is the general rule
that the "use" of a vehicle includes its loading and unloading, even ab-
sent express language in the insurance policy. 124 Hence, the majority's
opinion is supported by Colorado's adoption of the "completed opera-
tion" doctrine,' 2 5 which has been defined to include in its coverage all
activities required to effect a completed delivery. 126 Finally, it is well
settled that injuries resulting from the adjustment of cargo are causally
related to a proper "use" of the vehicle. 12 7 The Kohl holding is consis-
tent with these established principles of law.1
28
The arguments set forth in the above analysis establish that the in-
juries sustained by Kohl, Martino, and Connelly "arose from," "grew
out of," and "flowed from" the insured's use of the vehicle, and there-
fore, Union Insurance Company was liable for the resulting damages.
The Colorado Supreme Court's careful analysis of the totality of circum-
stances surrounding the instant case clearly justify this conclusion.
CONCLUSION
The opinion in Kohl v. Union Insurance Co. reaffirms important prin-
ciples regarding the interpretation and application of the basic automo-
bile insurance agreement. First, it recognizes that the "arising out of the
use" clause demands a broad and comprehensive construction due to its
inherent ambiguity. Second, it illustrates that the court has been liberal
in finding the "but for" relationship and in allowing recovery against
automobile insurance companies. Finally, it emphasizes the importance
of examining the totality of circumstances surrounding or leading up to
an accident or injury when determining whether such accident or injury
arose out of the use of the insured automobile within the meaning of the
liability policy.
Sarah W. Dickinson
123. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 81, at 19.
124. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text for a review concerning the scope of
coverage provided by the "completed operation" doctrine. This principle of law may be
applied to Kohl by reasoning that Weaver was merely engaged in additional activities which
were necessary in order to make a safe and completed delivery of the rifle.
127. See, e.g., Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mouse, 268 P.2d 886 (Okla.
1953) (the court held that a driver who fell from his truck, while adjusting cargo, was
injured as a result of the "ownership, maintenance or use" of the vehicle). See generally 12
G. CoucH, supra note 17, § 45:69, at 308-09.
128. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 137 n.4 (the majority stated: "Our conclusion is consistent with
the settled rule that injuries resulting from the adjustment of cargo and the loading and
unloading of vehicles are causally related to a proper use.")
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